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Abstract 
 
The United States equity market is made up of both private and public trading 
venues, creating a framework dark and light trading liquidity. Private or non-publicly 
visible liquidity is housed in dark venues while liquidity visible to the public sits in light 
locations. Light markets follow strict real-time public reporting requirements for trade 
volume and price; their dark counterparts execute transactions without a real-time 
reporting requirement. The informational asymmetries that result from this difference in 
reporting create a “two-tiered” market. The dark sector’s participants know both the 
public and dark, private, trade volumes and price, while the public participating in the 
light market knows only the publicly reported light sector volume and price information. 
Dark sector participants, institutional investors, then participate in the market using both 
private and public information, whereas the public investor only has access to the public 
information. This project seeks to motivate a real-time reporting requirement for trade 
volume and price in the dark sector of the market in order to remedy this public versus 
private asymmetry.  
The informational parameters in this thesis are only those relating to the trades 
taking place and their respective volumes and prices, not other outside of the market or 
participant specific informational parameters commonly used in the study of 
informational asymmetries. This project is an attempt to bridge both the legal aspects and 
iii 
economic foundations relating to the issues surrounding dark sector reporting. Sections I 
through IV seek to detail the sector and its regulation while sections V through VII 
briefly describe the related economic literature and the simple model at the heart of this 
thesis. Additional relevant citations on many issues outside the narrow breadth of this 
project can be found in the appendices and bibliography.  
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Section I. 
Introductions and Dark Beginnings1 
Financial markets are vast, every growing, and ever changing. Each day 
transactions, assessments, expectations, and the process by which markets introduce 
buyer and seller evolve. The venues where transactions take place are as varied and 
multifaceted as the financial mechanisms being traded. The United States is a global 
leader in the equity market internationally and has always stayed several years ahead of 
its European counterparts and even decades ahead of the Asian markets. With this comes 
a well-developed and detailed framework of regulations and an even more intricate and 
developed system of financial institutions and mechanisms. Part of the US dominance in 
the equity field stem from the surrounding landscape of technologically companies and 
private equity/venture capital firms surrounding the development of the domestic equity 
markets. Innovation and development in the land of equity markets are in a constant state 
of redevelopment, recalibration, and refinement. The battle for market share has been 
termed a “technological arms race” by many in the industry2, as technology seems to lead 
the market in offerings, assets and mechanisms, and hosting services. The dark sector’s 
                                                
1 “The Dark Side of the Force is the pathway to many abilities some consider to be… 
Unnatural.” - Senator Palpatine, Star Wars: Episode III, Revenge of the Sith (2005). 
 
2 Karl Marx also uses this description in reference to industrial capitalism; many 
academics outside of the financial sector discourse on the importance of technological 
competition. 
2 
existence is a cumulative result of the market regulatory changes and development taking 
place from the late 1990’s through early 2000’s. Technological innovations, regulatory 
changes, the decimalization of the equity sector, and the growth of capital accumulation 
and mobility through institutional investors provided a driver for dark venues and their 
services. Communication, processing speeds, and storage capabilities fundamentally 
changed the execution of trades and exponentially increased the speed of the market and 
its related information. Regulatory developments of the late 1990’s provided registration 
requirements for Alternative Trading Systems, required best quote dynamics to induce 
competition amongst differing trading orders, and regulation FD mandated information 
disclosure vastly shrinking the opportunity for information arbitrage. Decimalization 
reduced spreads down from unit “ticks” into decimal values, lowering profit margins and 
reducing liquidity values at a given price level. Institutional investors with large stores of 
accumulated capital, sophisticated market awareness, and complex sell and buy side 
liquidity preferences permanently altered the dynamics associated with trading volume 
and trade size. Dark liquidity has existed since the inception of the financial sector. 
Information-dark liquidity in the form of off-exchange trading and within book exchange 
mechanisms was always a facet of the market. Recent temporal, technological, and 
regulatory catalysts pushed the dark sector into the large market share it holds today. The 
old “high-touch” financial market model where the major exchanges held a monopoly 
over the entire equity sector is fading as the “low-touch” dark equity model takes over an 
ever-growing market share with an ever growing array of different venues and trading 
mechanisms catering to the differing needs of the institutional trading giants.  
3 
The dark sector is not necessarily a negative facet to the market as a whole as 
many have hypothesized. The focus need not be on the existence of the dark sector itself, 
but instead on the ability of the entire market to find an accurate market price. There are 
important informational characteristics for determining that accurate price inside the 
liquidity pools in the dark sector. The volume and price for each transaction in the dark 
sector are central informational components necessary for the market at large to 
determine an accurate price. This volume and price information must reach the light 
market’s participants real time in order for the market as a whole to determine an 
accurate price and for all participants to have the opportunity to trade at that price. 
Different informational reporting requirements for the light and dark sectors creates 
separate informational tiers in the market; the public sector is at a disadvantage compared 
to those who are participating in the dark sector. This dynamic creates concerns for both 
welfare and fairness for those who lack the capabilities to transact in the dark sector and 
are therefore trapped in the public market.  The informational disadvantage to the public 
sector prevents its public only participants from meaningfully participating in the 
financial market because they lack the informational access necessary to transact at the 
most accurate price. Light sector participants lack the transaction related volume and 
price information necessary to be aware of the most accurate market price, while the dark 
sector’s participants have access to that information. While a real time reporting 
requirement for volume and price would not cure the current issues associated with high 
frequency trading and others associated with our current regulatory reporting system, its 
4 
implementation would rectify the informational inequality among market participants 
who transact in the light sector with those who transact in both the light and the dark. 
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Section II. 
Migration to the Dark Side3 
Dark liquidity has always existed. In fact it is safe to say that before strict 
reporting requirements and the development of major exchanges and regulatory oversight 
bodies to whom reporting was done, all trades were in some sense, dark. The light sector 
is thought of as the traditional trading scheme because it has been the most publicly 
visible and prominent trading arena since before the 1930’s. The dark side on the other 
hand has always been shielded from public view and public awareness where possible. 
From its inception, off book, off exchange, or under the table trading practices have 
always been dark in the sense that the transaction’s participants expressly used the dark 
liquidity or mechanism to avoid going through public venues. The most important issues 
for the purpose of this discussion are the benefits and purposes of using the dark sector 
and how information present in the dark sector is regulated compared to those same 
characteristics in the light, or reporting, sector.  
It is relevant here to comment that the dark and light sectors make up the market 
as a whole, and that dark and light liquidity can execute one another. In this regard it is an 
over simplification to discuss the light and dark sectors as if they are two separate 
markets. The light and the dark sectors make up the trading market as we know it, and 
                                                
3 "Ahh, hard to see, the Dark Side is." – Yoda, Star Wars Episode I: The Phantom 
Menace (1999). 
 
6 
their relative market share and its implication is, at least in part, the focus of this paper. 
What follows is a brief overview of what has motivated participants in the past and 
currently to use the dark sector, and how the sector’s transformation has led to the 
perception of dark liquidity we have today.  
The development of dark trading mechanisms and the dark liquidity sector would 
fail to exist if it were the case that there was no difference between trading in the light 
sector and the dark. The dark sector theoretically provides market participants with four 
central benefits their light counterpart does not; confidentiality in the trades executed, 
reduced or avoided market impact relating to the trades, cost savings through dark venues 
or methods, and the opportunity for price improvement or profit. These four central 
tenants make up the rationale behind the existence of the dark sector and motivate the 
bounds sought by the regulation that have grown to surround the sector itself. Early on 
these opportunities for informational, price, and anonymity control led some market 
participants to work trades “off the books” and for other participants to use the early 
broker dealer regulations (or lack thereof) to execute trades without being forced to enter 
informational reports about the transactions. While today’s dark sector is a much more 
varied and complicated field, the benefits to making trades in the dark have changed little 
since the inception of the market itself. 
 The central benefit that has remained perhaps the strongest motivation for 
partaking in the dark sector’s transactional offerings is the ability to reduce market 
impact (or preserve price improvement or price control abilities). A reduction in market 
impact rests on several dark-ness related assumptions. The first of which is that the trade 
7 
itself actually carries the potential to impact the market; small trades leave little market 
impact whereas large or block trades can have a serious impact on the trading price of an 
asset where trading activity is visible. On an exchange where information is constantly 
displayed regarding trading behavior the supply of and demand for a certain asset 
determines its price. If a large block of shares placed into the exchange for purchase the 
supply would greatly increase and without an equivalent increase in the demand for that 
asset the price would decline. This price drop is the negative market impact institutional 
or large block investors are trying to avoid by executing their block trades through dark 
frameworks. Institutional investor interests in keeping large or block trading as “quiet” as 
possible also rest on preventing the negative implications that result when others are able 
to “see” the trade crossing the market. (SEC Proposed Rule on Dark Pools, 2013) 
 Other benefits relating to the anonymity of the transaction and the opportunity for 
relatively low costs4 in transacting away from the major or light venues are the point of 
much current discussion. Developments in reporting requirements made even dark sector 
transactions information laden. Where transactions would be reported at delayed times 
relative to the public sector and while those reports may protect some information 
regarding who transacted the trade itself, the communicative and informational 
capabilities of the current millennia had made anonymity a benefit of the past. A similar 
issue has arisen with the cost of transacting trades it the dark sector. While the cost to 
each individual transaction may be equal to or relatively less than those transactions in 
                                                
4 Costs both in relationship to the transacting with the dark venue and reduced costs for 
transacting large or controlled trades that may be costly when transacting with an 
exchange. 
8 
the light sector; the cost of remaining informed about dark transactions may be 
preventatively high. The informational analysis and synthesis capabilities required to 
remain informed with regard to other transactions taking place in the dark sector may 
require the participation in multiple different dark pools and the ability to synthesis trade 
information flowing from each individual dark venue or aggregator. Without these 
capabilities, the market participant is in essence just as blind as the public with regard to 
other dark sector transactions. Transactional costs in this sense include not only the costs 
associated with completing the transaction, but also the risk that other dark players know 
information that you do not. While trade anonymity and low transactional costs were 
previously central benefits to trading in the dark sector, they are no longer clear points 
differentiating life in the light and life in the dark. Instead, price controls and market 
impact controls emerged as the dominant features driving dark participants to transact.  
 This focus on price and market impact has also led to a change in the type of 
mechanism dark transactions go through. In the past off book, off exchange, and other 
behind closed door transactions could take place in a multitude of different ways; upstairs 
markets, broker dealer trades, and on actual dark liquidity venues. This dark sector has 
evolved from a series of varied mechanisms into a landscape of primarily “crossing” 
oriented venues. The focus on impact control and price benefit has led to a dark sector 
landscape dotted with transaction focused venues and venue aggregators. These venues 
provide participants with access to a variety of different informational control options and 
access to other dark participants and venues. These informational controls are now almost 
entirely related to the size of the trade being reported, the division amongst shares in a 
9 
particular trade, and the temporal and price related controls regarding the actual 
execution of the trade itself. While the dark landscape holds a plethora of venues, the 
venues all offer similar trade types, services, and conform to one of several venue 
designs. The dark sector is no longer as a varied as it once was, at least in part due to the 
narrowing of benefits flowing from dark transactions. The growth in market share of the 
dark sector is also likely a result of the changing dynamics of market participation. Many 
see the increase in size and number of institutional investors while the individual market 
participant has become more and more rare. A growth in the presence of institutional 
traders means a growth in the number of market participants capable of transacting in the 
dark sector, while there are no empirical studies to support this market change, the 
increasing presence and power of institutional investors in the market suggests an 
increase in the use of alternative trading mechanisms.  
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Section III. 
Dark Structure, Dark Actors, Dark Forces5 
The dark sector is made up of many venues and many aggregators. Colloquially 
these are often called “pools” and these pools refer to the groups of liquidity within the 
sector itself being housed in different venues or aggregators of venues. The dark pool 
does not represent a single venue or even a single type of equity trading mechanism. A 
Dark Pool can be defined broadly as any mechanism or venue that houses dark liquidity.6 
Dark liquidity is anonymous or non-displayed liquidity, or trade ready shares of a certain 
asset which have some level of information concealment/control related to their trades. 
Liquidity is anonymous or non-displayed if it is submitted or transacted through a venue 
confidentially and without full visibility to the market at large. The dark sector is then the 
culmination of all the dark venues and trading mechanisms through which liquidity can 
be transacted in the dark (without reporting). The assets traded in the dark sector are the 
same stocks and assets that are traded on the light market (generally, NSM stocks).  
While the light market includes both the primary or initial offering (IPO) market 
and the secondary market for the NMS stocks it carries, the dark market is only 
comprised of secondary trading liquidity; trades where shares are offered for the first 
                                                
5 “Size matters not. Look at me. Judge me by my size, do you?” - Yoda, Star Wars 
Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back (1980). 
 
6 Definitions for key terms can be found in Appendix II.  
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time to the public do not take pace in the dark sector. Initial offers and primary market 
sales cannot take place through dark venues. Unlike the light market, the dark sector, for 
various reasons, tended in the past toward large block trading with a heavy reliance on 
informational and trade parameters. Block trading transacts shares in large share blocks, 
groups or pools of 1,000 shares or more. These are the types of trades that would have the 
most intense market impact if they were transacted in the light and were typically 
transacted in the dark to avoid those implications. However, the types of transactions 
currently taking place in the dark sector are smaller groupings of shares, 300 shares per 
transaction on average. What used to be large single block transactions are now split into 
smaller groupings of shares to be transacted through several venues simultaneously. This 
both helps to avoid shallow liquidity issues venue to venue and controls the leakage of 
trade information coming out of any single venue relating to the size of the full 
transaction. The dark sector depends greatly on transactional liquidity controls and strong 
informational control of leakage with which to manipulate and hide these massive multi-
piece transactions.  
These two control facets come in many different types of pre-packaged trade 
offers and many different varieties of trade venues. These venues carry a vast array of 
services and functions and each venue is its own unique entity seeking to provide deep 
liquidity with a strong control on certain informational parameters related to the exchange 
(minimizing information leakage). The quintessential dark venue is the Crossing Network 
(CN). The crossing network is the most simple and most common venues found in the 
dark; other varieties of dark venues are typically structured based on the CN model. The 
12 
CN allows participants to enter priced orders and transact the order when matching 
interest is available. The single price for the transaction is derived from the light market 
price. (Securities and Exchange Commission, “Regulation of Exchanges,” 1997). 
Crossing networks, working entirely in the dark, allow participants to control a great deal 
of the information relating to their executions and their simplicity helps to avoid 
information leakage and over-complication of transactions. 
All dark mechanisms do not share the same level of informational controls with 
marked differences between CNs relating to how much informational freedom or control 
is available during a trade. In this context, not all dark pools are equally dark. Some pools 
allow for different forms of information to leave the pool, “leak out,” or simply be 
available to other participants in the pool, for this reason some venues are termed Gray 
Pools instead of carrying the normal dark nomenclature. The central commonality to all 
dark equity mechanisms is some form or degree of information control with regard to the 
trade itself. 
Fundamentally, trades are executed in the dark in a similar fashion to those in the 
light. Order parameters and execution requests function in almost the exact same fashion 
for the most part. In some instances IOI’s (Indication of Interest) or mechanism specific 
communication capabilities allow dark participants to employ more evasive or more 
communicative strategies for moving their assets than those capabilities afforded by the 
light market. However, the most important difference is the dark sector allows for explicit 
display or information parameters to be controlled with regard to the order. When trading 
across a dark venue (depending on the venue’s acceptable parameters), the investor can 
13 
control the amount of information that gets displayed relating to his order. The order’s 
informational components can be manipulated so that its volume is completely hidden, 
partially hidden, or fractured into multiple pieces described above. It is useful to note that 
the assets transacting through a dark venue, a gray venue, and those transacting in the 
light are not separate. Though informational parameters differ greatly amongst the trades 
that have taken place, dark, gray, and light orders can execute together or on one another. 
This means that some of the informational requests of parameters can include making 
part of the order dark and part of the order light, or any combination in between.  
The dark sector is predicated on the ability to execute transactions in order to 
control the display or leakage of information relating to the trade itself. Part of this 
control requires that a venue be able to transact the entire or the planned portion of the 
transaction without having to seek additional liquidity from another venue. The more a 
trade has to be broken up for execution on different venues or gets “shopped” around 
from venue to venue in an attempt to find liquidity to transact the execution the more 
information leaks out into the market and the less dark the transaction becomes. As time 
and number of venues increase, the risk of information leakage among the venues grows, 
and the trade becomes less and less dark. The necessity for access to deep liquidity in 
each of the venues themselves is part and parcel to the venue being able to completely 
control the information it releases to only those participating in it and not the participants 
at other venues. If the venue or aggregator has to go outside its network or to other 
independent venues to find additional liquidity information leaks out as a result of venue 
contacting additional venues about the transaction. 
14 
Dark mechanisms report trading parameters and opportunities to trade to their 
participants. They do not report the information regarding their transactions and the 
information present in the pool itself (interests to transact, pings, and other venue related 
communications) to the public at large, only the pools participants are privy to those 
informational pieces.7 Only participants in the pools gain information about the trades 
taking place, the volume of liquidity available in the pool, the information on future 
trades, and other opportunities within the pool or venue itself. Though transactions that 
take place in the dark may be invisible to the light market for a period of time, it is not 
the case that the venues themselves do not carry information. The venue must connect 
buyer and seller for any transaction to proceed, and for that to take place, pool 
participants must constantly be informed about trade opportunities, possibilities, the 
liquidity available, etc. The difference in who gets the information in the light (the 
general public) and who gets it in the dark (only pool participants), has led to the dark 
sector being classified as a private market while the light is the public market.8 In the 
public light part of the market, all trading information is disseminated to the public at 
large through real time trading information posted on open and accessible mechanisms 
(SEC Open Meeting Fact Sheet, Oct. 2009), while in the dark, the venues report small 
informational tags or informational subsets real time to their participants. This 
                                                
7 Dark venues report trade volumes to CTA in delayed or non-real time reporting. CTA 
then distributes that information in the same method as real time (light) exchange 
reporting. This reporting does not include the information relating to pings, IOI’s, or 
other venue specific pre-trade information. 
 
8This dynamic may also represent a strategic attempt to allow market distortion and price 
setting within the pool framework; these issues are outside the breadth of this thesis.   
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informational reporting dynamic has led many to call the current market a two-tiered 
system; where those predicating in the dark sector have both the information 
disseminated through the dark pools in which they participate and the information 
available to the public at large, while the general public only has the information that 
results from real time reporting in the light venues (SEC Release 2011).  
The result of this dynamic is the dark sector’s participants have more information 
than is afforded to the public through real time reporting, making the dark participants the 
top tier with more information and the public becomes the lower tier with only the 
information reported by CTA. This inequality in informational access is only exacerbated 
by the method in which dark participants can participate in the market as a whole. The 
market’s dark sector participants are institutional investors; large, heavy in assets and 
capital; typically investment firms, major banks, and other major market movers.9 These 
major players are sophisticated in their market experience, expertise, and their 
technological capabilities. They operate in the light and dark sectors concurrently using 
strategies and methods of mechanized and by hand trading regimes. 
“In practice the largest payers are likely to employ multiple strategies. 
They may tap the light and dark markets, simultaneously advertise and 
hide, use multiple dark venues, publish indications of interest rather than 
firm orders, use deceptive strategies to shake off any form of front 
runners, and use multiple brokers in some situations and take direct 
control of their orders in other cases.” (Banks 2010) 
 
Institutional investors carry massive stores of mobile capital and have developed 
resources for measuring the market and its dynamics; institutional investors are the 
                                                
9 Institutional investors are the Dark Actors in this model. They are (pardon the analogy) 
the sith lords of the modern financial market; sophisticated and holding sufficient capital 
to control the dark-light relationship completely. 
16 
quintessential purveyors of dark and high-volume trading. Dark venues and the no-
displayed sector play host to high level gaming, algorithmic trading, and other dark 
roaming tools that make dark market participation increasingly dangerous for the average 
or non-institutional investor. Beneficial executions through the light and dark markets 
require an extremely developed tactical approach common almost exclusively to 
institutional firms that house dedicated and intricate algorithmic trading capabilities, 
stores of deep liquidity, and the ability to seek expertise from brokers and block-dealers. 
The institutional investor’s goal in participating in the market is to facilitate reaching a 
better price by strategically participating in the dark and light sectors of the market.  
Institutional investors are big, they are backed by hundreds of millions of dollars 
in capital and assets, and they carry the most well developed and experienced market 
strategies that exist. However, one of their most important features is how they tend to 
participate in the dark sector. Because dark reporting is only made to pool participants, 
only the participants in each individual pool know about the availability of transactions or 
liquidity. In order to be party to all available transactions and all available dark 
information, institutional investors have availed themselves of participating in many, if 
not all, the venues and aggregators in the dark sector.  Consequently, the institution 
knows the information present in every venue, and therefore, all the information present 
in the dark sector at any time. Being privy to every pool is costly and only the biggest 
institutions can foot the bill and the costs associated with dealing with the bulk of 
information they receive. This participation dynamic produces an extreme to the two-
tiered informational groups where the big institutions have access to all the information 
17 
present in the market at any time, all the dark information and any public information 
available, while the public only has access to the information stemming from the light 
sector.  
This presents major fairness and welfare concerns for the public’s ability to 
meaningfully participate in the market. Excluding long-term investment, making money 
on the market relies entirely on knowledge of the accurate or appropriate price for a stock 
at any given time. Without access to the full gambit of available information relating to 
the appropriate price being offered and asked for a given stock in any sector of the market 
the public cannot properly price its own transactions, and more importantly the light 
sector may carry an inaccurate price. These informational parameters will be discussed 
later in relation to market efficiency models; however, the focus here is not on market 
efficiency, but instead on the welfare concerns that result from an unequal distribution of 
informational access among market participants. The institutional investors are privy to 
information about the volume and price for the transactions taking place in the dark 
sector real time and the public is not; dark participants are aware of all facets relating to 
an appropriate price and the public is not.   
In the light sector exchange trades are reported or displayed as they take place, 
real time. So the public is made aware of the changing supply and demand dynamics of 
each asset as it gets traded in and out of the exchange. The public has information about 
the depth of liquidity, breadth of the market, and the markets determined price for any 
asset being traded. In the dark context it is quite possible that none of this information 
exists. In the dark market sector, there may only be certain informational parameters 
18 
available with regard to a trade, the volume in a pool, or the volume in the sector as a 
whole. 
Trading volume flowing across dark pools is measured in a myriad of ways and 
few venues use the same metrics for examining their own trading volume. The four more 
common measurement parameters for the equity sector are; the immediacy at which 
trading can take place, the breadth of a given market, the depth of that market, and the 
resiliency of the security (asset) itself. Immediacy, breadth, and depth all reflect the 
liquidity a given venue has in a certain asset; how fast the trade can be executed, how 
much can be executed at once; and spread at which a price can be determined. Resiliency 
of the asset reflects the nature of the price stability associated with the asset and how 
easily it might fluctuate. One central issue with regard to the information pertaining to 
each one of these parameters is that by the very nature of being dark, the venues housing 
dark liquidity are the only entities that have access to this information about their markets 
and it is to their benefit to be the most liquid and appealing they can possibly make 
themselves. 
“Measuring liquidity in a marketplace is a complicated proposition, made 
even more complex by growing pockets of activity in non-displayed 
forums, where record keeping and data reporting are not always 
mandatory or uniform, and where certain venues may have some interest 
in presenting statistics in one direction or another.” (Banks 2010) 
 
The current reporting systems, fail to distinguish between light and dark trading 
activity and they do not require a standardized method for volume calculation. For 
example, there are several different metrics for “counting” the number or volume or 
orders that come across an exchange interface; metrics relate to the number of orders 
19 
processed, those actually executed, and several different measures exist for how to count 
those orders (some venues double count, some single count, some only count executions, 
and others include all orders that ‘touch’ their venue). In this case it is possible for the 
same number of orders to be counted at least four different ways, leading venues to 
constantly calculate their trading volumes differently.  
The basic result is not only does the general public have little idea as to what goes 
on in the dark, even where the dark sector reports its volume and general trading 
information to the regulatory bodies, the metrics for volume, trades, and market share 
present a varied and unreliable measure. In short the only parties who know how much 
trading activity and how much volume is being transacted through the dark sector are the 
institutional investors participating in the pools and the venues themselves, and even 
those entities have to manage the differences from venue to venue in volume and trade 
classification and definition. The dark sector’s measurement is almost impossible to 
take10 without specific guidelines for volume, trade, execution, and liquidity definitions 
and regulations. 
Central to the issue of measuring the dark sector, its pools, and venues is the 
structure of the dark sector itself. In its early years, the dark sector blossomed into a 
framework of venues each holding small pools of liquidity, and the entire sector carrying 
a small share of the market as a whole. As the popularity of transacting in the dark 
progressed, the sector fragmented into many small venues offering smaller and smaller 
                                                
10 The current estimations as to the market share actually held in the dark sector range 
from 25 – 45% of the NMS market in the United States, and little work has lately been 
completed regarding the accuracy of either end of these estimations.  
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pools of liquidity. Fragmentation has both benefits and consequences. While a 
fragmented nature provides the opportunity for competition, it also has the potential to 
render trading sub-optimal. Whether or not fragmentation actually leads, through a loss in 
liquidity, to sub-optimality inside a given venue (as opposed to across an entire market) 
has been the topic of hot debate and many believe that any loss of optimality has more to 
do with the structure of the trading mechanism than the fragmentation or loss of liquidity 
itself. However, there are those who see greater fragmentation across multiple venues as 
a “potential for system failures to spread quickly and affect the entire market,” (Stiglitz; 
WSLawyer.com, Sec. 19) More from the lack of liquidity than the threat of possible 
systematic failures, the dark sector has for several years been in the process of 
consolidating itself. Competition and a general need for access to liquidity to execute 
block trades gave way to mass consolidation of venues under venue aggregators. While 
any venue could control some of the parameters with regard to its trade, where there was 
a lack of liquidity, shopping around venue to venue for liquidity reduced the 
informational controls associated with the trade itself. The mode from which trades can 
be given parameters and traded in bulk, pieces, as ice-bergs11 or anything else depends on 
the trade actually taking place in real time across the exchange mechanism; with many 
small dark venues coming online competition increased and dark sector fragmentation 
became a growing issue. Liquidity and the fungibility of liquidity and execution are 
central to the success of any trading mechanism, without access to sufficient commodity 
volume a trading pool “dries up.” While offering specialized and commoditized trading 
                                                
11 Tip or small subset of the trade is made visible to the light market, while the bulk of the 
trade is kept dark or hidden (all Titanic references aside).  
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parameters and structures is the norm in the dark sector, the diversity of venues has 
spread liquidity thinly and has motivated consolidation among venues and mechanisms in 
hopes of gaining an increase in depth and liquidity. With an increase in liquidity, trading 
volumes increased leading to a drop in execution related costs and suggesting that the 
dark sector experiences highly effective internal economies of scale. The relationship of 
this consolidation dynamic to the volume or execution volume related regulatory 
practices will be discussed in a later section, but it is safe to say that the sector itself no 
longer carries individual or unconnected venues. The vast majority of venues are housed 
under aggregators or connected through contractual agreements to other venues where 
informational controls can flow through the aggregator’s venues and the connected 
venues with minimal informational leakage. The consolidation and aggregator 
developments have side-stepped many of the earlier issues with shallow pool liquidity 
and inability to complete full transactions present in the more antiquated version of the 
dark sector.   
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Section IV. 
Dark Regulation12 
The regulation of the securities markets has, from its inception, been based on the 
notion that providing information to market participants provides fairness (Hatch 2010) 
and efficient market function (Malkiel 1992). The basic regulatory framework is a system 
of informational disclosure requirements whereby the nation’s publicly held companies 
submit information through public reporting requirements so the public is constantly 
informed of the relevant information necessary to determine a proper price and to 
facilitate informed and fair trading. The earliest securities or national market regulatory 
acts were the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.13 These 
Acts serve as the foundation to the nation’s current regulatory framework and delegate 
regulatory authority to the Securities and Exchanges Commission. Explicit further 
refinements of the regulatory landscape did not take place until the 1990’s, when 
restrictions and reporting requirements on brokers, broker-dealers, public companies, and 
exchanges dramatically increased the amount of information entering the market.14 The 
best price available and the spread of each stock being traded was now made publicly 
                                                
12 “This is some rescue! You came in here, but didn’t you have a plan for getting out?” -
Princess Leia, Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope (1977). 
 
13 Citations, explanations, and additional information on regulation, regulatory entities, 
and governmental bodies can be found in Appendix I. 
 
14 Regulation OHR and Regulation FD  
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available, and public companies had to increase their public reporting to include many 
previously unattainable informational parameters; stock sales, managerial decisions, and 
other pertinent information. The public was now granted a direct look into public trading 
exchanges and the companies being traded. 
In the late 90’s and early 2000’s regulations on alternative trading systems and the 
national market system changed the previous interpretations and reporting requirements 
for the alternative or non-major exchanges.15 While the systematic requirements for the 
major exchanges and public companies changed little as a result of regulations ATS and 
NMS, the alternative or non-major exchanges classified under Sections 5 and 6 of the 
Exchange Act were formally defined and explicitly excluded from the reporting 
requirements of the major exchanges. Alternative trading systems include the 
mechanisms used to trade dark liquidity. Regulation ATS and NMS both excluded the 
dark sector from following the informational reporting required on the major exchanges 
and instead instituted a by volume reporting system, which allows for delayed trade 
volume reports instead of real time trade by trade reporting. Regulation NMS created the 
volume decimalization reporting system to be followed at all exchanges carrying 
National Market Stocks. The mass decimalization of the market led to a dramatic increase 
in the use of dark block trading practices because it drastically changed the market’s 
spread dynamics and best price offering requirements substancially increased the impact 
large trades had on the market price of a decimalized stock. 
                                                
15 Regulation ATS and Regulation NMS 
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Under this framework, the mechanisms of the dark sector register as broker-
dealers, and fall within the Alternative Trading System definition under the Acts and 
have their own particular reporting requirements. The only two hurdles that must be 
cleared in order to trade as an alternative system and avoid being classified as a major 
exchange, are first to register as a broker-dealer, explicitly placing oneself under the ATS 
definition, and second that the trading volume one executes does not exceed 5% of the 
national trading volume in that particular stock (NMS stocks).16 This orientation on 
exchange determination in concert with the aggregator venue structure of the dark sector 
will be discussed at length later. It is useful to note that under the ATS definition the 
percentage of NMS stock transacted is only a requirement on venues, which actually 
execute trades. This regulation does not apply to aggregators or brokers or dealers, who 
do not actually execute trades themselves. The entities connecting traders to venues or to 
other traders can handle far more than 5% of an NMS stock in referrals or connects, 
while it is the venues they connect traders to that are held to the 5% ceiling. An 
aggregator can handle 6% or more in a given stock as long as each of the venues it houses 
or direct clients to transacts a volume less than 5%. 
This framework of regulatory mechanisms worked to motivate an even greater 
movement into the dark sector. The 1933 and 34 Acts required that the public market 
always be informed; regulations through the 1990’s required a greater and greater 
informational swath be provided to the public; regulation ATS explicitly removed dark 
trading mechanisms from the reporting requirements of the major exchanges; and 
                                                
16 Regulation ATS 
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regulation NMS decimalized the market as a whole causing price impact to become 
unavoidable. The public market became so informed and the spreads on decimalized 
stocks had become so small with block trading causing massive market reaction each 
time a block entered the well informed market, the dark sector became the outlet. The 
dark sector allowed for informational controls, reduction in the impact block trading 
might have on the market, and most centrally, the dark sector was not required to report 
its trades in real time. It is then little surprise that the dark sector’s growth has been 
nothing but astronomical in the past years and pressures to ‘fix’ the regulatory gap in 
informational reporting spurred a plethora of regulatory attempts. (Gallo 2009) 
In the fall of 2009 the Securities and Exchange Commission held an open meeting 
in hopes of proposing a new set of regulation over the dark sector as fears about its 
strength, market share, and volume began to come to fruition. The meeting was titled, 
“Strengthening the Regulation of Dark Pools,” (SEC Open Meeting Oct. 2009) and 
specified two central regulatory goals or focus points for the proposed regulation: to 
require some form of publicly available material as to the investor’s interest in the sale or 
purchase of an asset and to the identity of the venue processing the transaction itself. The 
proposal was intended to enhance transparency and to promote fairer, more efficient 
markets for stocks listed in the US. The Commission later proposed a three-part rule-
making (SEC Release No. 34-60997) in hopes of attaining these regulatory goals: [1] to 
include the information contained within the dark venues in public reporting, [2] to alter 
the volume requirement under regulation ATS17 in an attempt to force dark venues to 
                                                
17 Changing the volume marker from 5% to .25%.  
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register as public exchanges, and [3] to change the information disseminated as a result of 
the delayed volume reporting coming out of dark venues. This regulation was never 
enacted, but was followed by a 2011 FINRA filing with the Commission in which the 
Regulatory Authority sought to allow certain alternative venues to be excluded from 
reporting requirements and other requirements (similar to the aims of regulation ATS), 
though this attempt was also never made operable. (FINRA Proposed Rule Change, 
2011) 
As of yet, no new rules have been put into place to balance the flow of 
information in the public exchanges with information in the dark sector. The implications 
of what might have been for the 2009 SEC rule proposition will be discussed at length in 
concert with the model proposed in this project. The orientation of previous regulation 
has both created the demand for dark sector liquidity and helped to foster its growth. The 
latest rule-making attempts have not been focused on the right issue of regulation, the 
informational parameters being reported and the type of reporting taking place. The focus 
and breadth of previous regulation instrumentally created the demand for the dark sector 
while also being inadequately and improperly focused to bring about an information 
balance between the light and the dark sectors.  
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Section V. 
Informational Asymmetries, Dark Impact, Dark Price18 
 
The importance of information has been a pillar of market function and exchange 
for centuries; exchanges and games of chance were thought to depart from equality or 
fairness when different participants had different levels of information about the situation 
or the exchange (Cardano 1564). The efficiency of markets based on the information 
reflected in its exchanges dates back to the 17th century (Gibson 1889). The notion that 
complete information makes markets efficient has been the bedrock for informational 
reporting requirements and the notion of market participant equality almost since the 
inception of the market itself. The notion of market efficiency was codified in Fama’s 
1970 Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama 1970).  
 A market is efficient if the price being offered on the market for an asset fully 
reflects all the relevant information available (Fama 1970). This can also be defined as 
the market carrying a price that is unaffected by revealing information to market 
participants, in other words, the price already reflects all relevant information (Malkiel 
1992). The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) itself asserts that markets are in fact 
efficient. This claim has been refuted by many, supported by some, and completely 
                                                
18 “If there's a bright center to the universe, you're on the planet that it's farthest from.” – 
Luke Skywalker, Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope (1977).  
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disassembled by others; and there remains little consensus as to the effectiveness or 
accuracy of the model itself. However, for the purpose of this examination, the important 
features of the EMH model are its definitional components and the importance it places 
on the types, freedom, and completeness of the informational parameters that should go 
into determining the market price for an asset.  
 Definitionally, the components and interpretations associated with the EMH can 
be viewed as moving goalposts as opposed to firm definitions; however, they are of no 
less importance (Sewell 2011). An efficient securities market can be described as one 
where, given all available information, actual prices on the market are reliable or good 
estimates for the intrinsic values of each of the stocks or securities being transacted 
(Fama 1965 (The Behavior of Stock-market Prices)). The market is one where 
participants work to profit maximize and relevant information is freely (or almost freely) 
available to all participants (Fama 1965 (Random Walks in Stock Market Prices); Coase 
1960). The market must both fully and quickly reflect all the information which is 
relevant and available for each of its securities (Fama 1969/1970). This type of market 
efficiency and complete information reflection in prices can also be defined as efficiency 
that makes it impossible to make money by trading on current information since that 
information must already be fully reflected in the price of an asset (Jensen 1978). These 
definitions, along with the plethora of other re-workings, expansions, and consolidations, 
are all focused on the central notion of the market being constantly and fully informed in 
order to be termed “efficient.” The most relevant culmination of this notion comes from 
Malkiel,  
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“A capital market is said to be efficient if it fully and correctly reflects all 
relevant information in determining security price. Formally, the market is 
said to be efficient with respect to some information set, Ø, if security 
prices would be unaffected by revealing that information to all 
participants. Moreover, efficiency with respect to an information set, Ø, 
implies that it is impossible to make economics profits form trading on the 
basis of Ø.” (1992) 
 
 Based on these definitions, the regulatory framework surrounding the information 
attached to the trades taking place in dark sector, the public sector is not efficient with 
regard to the information held in the dark sector. In Fama’s design the EMH model 
contains three forms or strengths regarding the relevance or importance of different 
information in the market being efficient or inefficient. The three forms include; [1] the 
Weak Efficiency form, where the relevant information already included in the price 
extends to only information about past prices, [2] the Semi-Strong Efficiency form, 
where the relevant information set includes all information available to all the market 
participants, and [3] the Strong Efficiency form, where all information, including private 
information, is already taken into account in the market price of an asset (Fama 
1970/1991). The first and second forms can be regarded as the typical view of the public 
market or light sector; the previous price movements of a given stock are known to all 
market participants, and any other publicly available information has already been traded 
upon such that additional profits cannot be made by trading on the currently available 
information. The third form, or Strong Form, suggests that even the information held 
privately and not available to the public market has already been taken into account in the 
public market price of an asset. Given the current structure, punishing insider trading, the 
strong form seems an inappropriate application to the real world securities market. The 
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notion of private information being reflected in prices has a greater application than the 
insider or individual with personal information making personal or individual trades 
model. 
 The dark sector, also often termed the private sector of the market contains its 
own information. In a way it functions like the inside trader in the above example, 
holding information unavailable to the public about recent or current relevant trading 
activity. The current structure surrounding trade and informational reporting requirements 
allows for private sector participants to trade on the information in their sector without 
informing the public of that relevant information set without punitive repercussions. Then 
it appears that while the regulatory structure for individual traders gives value to personal 
or insider information when an individual trades personally in the public market; while 
the same informational components when transacted from the dark sector into the light 
sector are viewed as valueless. In other words, the regulatory trading framework views 
private information unavailable to the public learned in the personal or professional 
context as both private and valuable, while information unavailable to the public learned 
in the dark sector as private but invaluable, attaching legal recourse to the former and not 
the latter. Regulators then seem to refute the Strong Form EMH in the personal or 
insider-trading context while validating the Strong Form in the dark sector to light sector 
trades. This dichotomy will be discussed at greater length in the section on regulatory 
proposition.  
 Perhaps the most interesting intersection of the EMH model provides in the 
context of the private versus public market sector discourse relates to the issue of price 
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determination. Each iteration, version, reduction, and expansion of the EMH and even 
those that stand to prove the model impossible, improbable and irrelevant support the 
notion that information in some form is both relevant and necessary in determining 
accurate prices. It deserves a bit of reiteration here that the dark sector does not find or 
determine its own price, but derives or uses the price that is being offered in the light 
market. So the public price is the price used in both sectors of the entire market, and the 
price being found in the public market is inherently inefficient with regard to the 
information available in the private market sector (in the real time).  
 How the price is found in the light market is extremely important. Price 
determination is a haughtily contested and often debated topic; many different theories, 
market models, and orientations coming from an even greater number of fundamental 
theoretical foundations contend that the commodities, agents, and forums of exchange 
create and mold the price at which a trade is transacted in an ever changing myriad of 
ways. In the most basic sense, the interplay of the demand for an asset and the supply of 
that asset can be used as the determinants of its price. When demand increases while 
supply remains constant the price increases and when supply increases without an 
increase in demand price decreases, and so on. In the securities market, demand reflects 
the profit maximizing behavior of the market’s participants perceiving a trading 
opportunity to make themselves a profit (through the change in a stock’s price) or lack 
thereof. This dynamic is stabilized through a requirement that the market makers or 
specialists at the public market exchanges always execute the entirety of the orders on 
their books at any time. For example in the public market a supply of shares cannot sit on 
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the exchange un-transacted, and an order for shares cannot go unfilled. In order to ‘clear’ 
their exchange the specialist or market makers either lower the transaction price to clear 
surplus supply or increase the price to meet excess demand and so forth. However, the 
key issue in this framework for consideration here is how market participants know what 
direction the market is moving. 
 When transactions take place across the light market, informational reports on 
each transacted volume and its price are reported real time (seconds). The public is 
immediately made aware of the transactions, which have taken place, at what price those 
transactions crossed the market, and how much of the asset was sold. This means that in 
the light market when demand or supply shifts and transactions begin to move, the 
market is aware of it and shifts immediately with all participants immediately clearing the 
market. This type of informational and pricing model is considered both “fair” and 
“equitable” in the regulatory context, and the framework of informational reporting for 
trades that take place in the public sector seeks to keep this “fairness” intact. The 
reporting of trades and their prices seeks to inform all public market participants of the 
movements in the market, in essence informing them of the appropriate price that a stock 
can be transacted at for any given time. This publicly reported and publicly determined 
price is then used in the dark sector as a price marker for its transactions.  
 The non-reporting or dark sector, by definition, cannot find its own price. There is 
no dissemination of information on the supply of, demand for, or volume of any stock in 
the non-reporting sector. There is no requirement that non-reporting venues execute all 
orders, demand for, or supply of any given stock. Within a single venue or aggregator, 
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informational parameters exchanged between venue participants may give sufficient 
information as to what the demand or supply of a given stock in that particular venue 
might be, but without the price provided by the public market that inside venue 
information is likely insufficient to find an accurate price.19 The notion that the market 
has two-tiers of informational knowledge rests on the knowledge participants have about 
what price should be available for making their transaction. The dark sector is aware both 
of its own supply and demand for a given stock, and of the supply and demand for that 
stock in the public market. An asymmetry or meaningful difference in information is 
created when those two supply and demand relationships or those two prices do not 
match. When the price being offered in the light market and the price available in the 
non-reporting market do not match, the dark sector gains an informational advantage over 
the public. Institutional investors privy to the knowledge about the price difference can 
act on it, trading in the light, in the dark, or using both sectors, while the public cannot act 
on the information it doesn’t have and may lose the opportunity for price benefit because 
of it.  
 One key note worth repeating, there are many different forms of information and 
this project only seeks to provide motivation for dark sector volume and trade reporting 
as a means of informing the public sector of the information on trade volume and price in 
the non-reporting venues. Other projects and the vast majority of research on 
informational relationships in different market sectors within the greater securities 
                                                
19 This dynamic is also present in the light market; where a sufficient amount of liquidity 
in a stock has moved or been transacted in the dark market, the light sector may then be 
unable to find an accurate price. Insufficient volume, or liquidity in a stock can make its 
price unrealistic and inaccurate.   
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landscape discuss informational asymmetries in a more detailed and nuanced fashion. 
The previous models discuss informed and uninformed investors relating to levels of 
individual information that some investors know while others do not. This dichotomy, 
while indicative of the same relationship as the dark participants and their light 
counterparts, has a different type of information at its core and a plethora of different 
nuances and outcomes with regard to what informed participation means in the context of 
the reporting and non-reporting sectors. In these studies the informed traders typically 
carry information that comes from outside the market, information with some sort of 
public time horizon (to be discussed following). The traders come into the trading venue 
carrying information the public is as of yet unaware, information from outside the dark 
and light sectors of the market20 and trade on that information. This style of informational 
asymmetry carries a heavy and extensive foundation of research both theoretical and 
empirical.21 The broad foundational behind the study of informational asymmetries in 
finance stands to support the concept that with informational differences in market 
participants come disproportionate profit and benefit availabilities. Market participants 
with more information have a greater ability to profit from that information because they 
know the appropriate or accurate price for an asset, while the uninformed do not know 
what the appropriate price should be. In its more simple sense, this type of informational 
                                                
20 This type of information can be information relating to a forthcoming news report, 
insider information, or any informational parameters from outside the market the 
informed trader knows while the public does not. This information can also be described 
as the information that the market is not yet efficient with regard to, or with which the 
trader can still make a profit.  
 
21 Pertinent citations listed in bibliography.  
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disadvantage is the motivation for insider trading prohibitions and support for 
disregarding the strongest form of the EMH. However, there is disagreement among 
scholars as to how non-reported or hidden trading activity fits within the framework of 
informational asymmetries. For many, the existence of hidden trading activity reduces the 
ability of the market to find an accurate price, or increases the disparity between those 
who are informed and those who lack information (Ye 2011 and Kyle 1985).  
These models typically represent information as having a horizon, or only being 
useful for a certain period of time. For example, this information could be the knowledge 
a certain trader has about an earnings announcement yet to be reported, and the horizon 
represents the time at which the report will be made to the public. Before the horizon has 
been reached the trader has the information, while the public does not. This structure 
functions well as an analogy for the type of information available to dark sector 
participants because the reporting structure in the dark sector has an important horizon 
for when the volume related information relating to the trades within the dark pool will 
actually be made known to the public. Current US regulation creates a small but viable 
horizon for the trade information within each venue where pool participants are aware of 
the trade volume, and price, but the market at large has yet to be informed through CTA 
reporting. However, this is only viable as an analogy since previous informational models 
do not focus on the information contained within the dark pool itself but focus on trader 
information brought into the market from outside with a horizon based not on trade 
reporting, but on public informational releases.  
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Zhu (early access December 2013) reflects a detailed culmination of the venue 
and dark pool specific research on these types of informational asymmetries and produces 
a persuasive argument for the inclusion of dark venues improving accurate price 
discovery. This model and various others details the importance of motivating informed 
traders into participating in the market in order for their trading behavior to add 
information to the market necessary to determine an appropriate price. Zhu shows that 
this self-selective behavior of informed traders employing anonymous-venues may 
actually help the market to find appropriate prices so long as the volume and trade 
information from dark venues gets reported real-time to the public exchanges. This 
informational dynamic is the best balance and the most helpful academic work in putting 
this thesis project into its proper place with regard to other market information and 
informational asymmetries projects and research. The following regulatory suggestion 
seeks to motivate a real-time reporting requirement for the trade volume and price 
information within the trades taking place in the non-reporting sector only because of the 
price information laden inside the trading itself. While research on informational 
asymmetries has focused on the information traders and participants bring to the market 
from the outside, this project seeks to provide an extremely simple motivation for 
informing the market at large, not of outside information, but of the trade volume and 
price information inside the venues and trades within the dark sector.  These are 
differences in information access between the two market tiers relating strictly to trade 
volumes and prices in the dark sector.  
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Section VI. 
Dark Models for Dark Propositions22 
  
Because of the difference in reporting requirements currently in place for light 
and dark transactions, the information received by the public is different than information 
promulgated through dark channels. This informational case comparison makes the 
opportunity available for dark market participants to benefit from the public’s lack of 
unreported information by making a multi-part transaction using both the light and dark 
sides of the market. Because the public does not have the transactional information 
available to dark participants, the public can miss opportunities for price improvement 
and allow dark participants to benefit from their missed opportunity. Below is a highly 
simplified explanation of three different transactions and the three outcomes for 
transaction participants. Following the brief description is a discussion of the results 
when the simple case comparison is compared to various reality issues.  
In these three cases the prices and risks are associated with the sectors that 
transactions take place in, not with the asset being transacted itself (as is usually the case 
when prices are discussed crossing the equity market). This focuses on a single block of 
shares made up of a single asset. The price differences are related to the venues in which 
the trade is being made and reflect the laden information being reported at each stage. 
                                                
22 “We meet again, at last. The circle is now complete. When I left you, I was but the 
learner; now I am the master.” Darth Vader, Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope (1977). 
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The dark sector participant is the typical institutional investor and the public investor (or 
purchaser) is a market participant who does not get the information in the dark pool until 
the delayed dark pool reporting takes place.  
This simple comparison involves an institutional investor making a one or two 
part trade; light market only, dark market into the light market without real-time dark 
reporting, and a dark to light trade with real-time reporting. The investor seeks to 
purchase a large volume of a single stock from the market at large and, for all intensive 
purposes, has no preference as to which market he uses so long as he can purchase the 
shares as cheaply as possible. The three trades all take place across a single time period 
consisting of three segments from T1 to T3. Each of the transactions begins at T1 and is 
completed at T3. As each trade crosses the market from start to finish the price moves 
from P3 to P1; moving from the lowest price (P1) through P2 and finishing at the highest 
price (P3). Each price increase is equal to the previous one. It is also assumed that there 
are no transactional differences in costs between transacting in the light and transacting in 
the dark. These are strong assumptions but result in a meaningfully simple outcome, 
which motivates a clean and simple discussion of the reality associated with each of these 
assumptions. 
Case 1: Traditional Public Exchange Transaction 
Purchase across the light market and only the light market  
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Case 2: Dark to Light Without Real-Time Reporting 
Purchase in the dark market followed by a Purchase in the light market; 
Reporting of the dark transaction (increase in demand) does not take place 
until after the light transaction  
Case 3: Dark to Light With Real-Time Reporting 
Purchase in the dark market followed by a purchase in the light market 
under a real-time dark trade-reporting requirement (dark transaction is 
reported before light transaction takes place) 
Each of the three simple models provides a different outcome for each market 
participant. In Case 1 the institutional investor purchases a large volume of shares (1 
million shares) through the light market and only the light market. The second the 
purchase order enters the light market and transactions ensue, real time reporting of each 
transaction (each share or smaller group of shares being sold to the institutional investor) 
informed the public that the demand for the stock has increased, that volume is 
transacting across the market, and that the price associated with the stock is rising. The 
shares bleed across the market as supply fills his order, share-by-share, or group-by-
group. The entire 1 million shares are not purchased in a single clump at a single price. 
The price moves from the lowest P1 to the highest P3 but the institutional investor does 
not know how much of his desired volume will trade at what price and he cannot control 
how many units cross the market at various prices. The purchase order for his large 
volume of shares across the light market may immediately increase the price to P3 forcing 
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all of his shares to cross the market at the highest price, forcing him to purchase all of his 
shares at the highest possible price.  
In Case 2 the institutional investor conducts a two-part transaction. He makes his 
first purchase across a dark venue. He purchases the first half of his 1 Million shares 
through a dark venue and as a result the transaction and its price are not reported real 
time to the market at large before he begins his second transaction; purchasing the second 
500 thousand shares through the light market. Both the first transaction and the second 
transaction enter their respective venues at P1. The First transaction across the dark venue 
transacts in its entirety at P1. The second transaction then enters the light market at P1 
because the public-market it still unaware of the first transaction (unaware of the increase 
in demand for the stock in the market as a whole). In the course of the second transaction 
the stock crosses the market moving from P1 to P2. The institutional investor was able to 
buy the entire stock volume with the first half at P1 and the second half at some price 
between P1 and P2.  The market price associated with the stock does not progress to P3 
until the delayed reporting from the private sector informs the public sector that the first 
transaction took place (informs the public market as to the full demand for the stock on 
the market). Once this report takes place the institutional investor holds all 1 million 
shares, now all worth P3, but he purchased those shares at a price between P1 and P2. In 
short the institutional investor holds the same volume and worth as he held at the end of 
the first transaction, but he purchased the shares at a much lower price. Also, in model 2 
the public did not benefit from selling its shares at a price between prices P2 and P3 
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because they were unaware of the first transaction’s information on the increased demand 
for the stock on the market as a whole.  
In Case 3 the institutional investor makes his first transaction through a dark 
venue in the same fashion as he did in Model 2. He transacts the first 500 thousand shares 
at P1. However, in this scenario the volume and price information related to his first trade 
are reported to the public market real time. Moments following his first transaction the 
public market is made aware of the increased demand for the stock he purchased and 
increases its price from P1 to P2. The institutional investor then proceeds to make his 
second transaction in the light market, purchasing another 500 thousand shares. This 
time, the transaction enters the market at P2 and transacts across the market moving from 
P2 to P3. Again at the end of the transactions the institutional investor holds 1 million 
shares all valued at P3 and he has paid some price between P1 and P3 to get the shares. In 
this scenario the institutional investor could still control the price of his very first 
transaction in the private sector, purchasing the shares at P1, the key difference here is 
that the public did not miss out23 on the chance to sell its shares to the institutional 
investor between P2 and P3 when he went to make his transaction in the public market. In 
this case, the institutional investor has the opportunity for arbitrage, more limited than in 
the second case, but the level of control still available through the dark sector could be 
considered a form of insurance against the risk of an erratic price jump if the transaction 
was entirely transacted in the light. This case preserves a benefit to transacting in the dark 
                                                
23 The public does not recognize the entire price increase, some benefit still remains for 
transacting in the dark sector for the institutional investor. However, the public does not 
miss as much of the surplus transfer as they did in the second case.  
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sector, while still protecting the public from completely missing out on the opportunity 
for price improvement. 
The reporting requirement, in particular the temporal requirement, separates these 
two public and private trade scenarios. In the current regulatory framework the private 
market participant can make market moving trades without suffering the price impact of 
his trade by using a quick (but not necessarily high speed) two part transaction from the 
private into the public sectors of the market, while still benefiting from the transaction 
when delayed reporting takes place. A similar, though reversed, transaction can be 
facilitated to avoid price impact in the sale of stock by an institutional investor. This 
model is extremely simple, if not over simplified, however, the more realistic the 
discussion of its price, transaction, and other concerns the more intense the disparity 
between the private and public participants.  
One key point of discussion is this comparison’s dependence on a simple price 
structure. The price movements resulting from the purchases of large volumes of shares 
across the different venues are obvious and simple, however, the assumption that each of 
the prices achieved are equivalent is a stretch. It is more than likely that prices achieved 
at each stage in the model above differ from venue to venue. It is possible that the cases 
all begin at different prices, reach different prices in the interim and finish at different 
times. None of these price differences change the fact that the institutional investor has 
the ability to arbitrage and to control the appropriation of transaction surplus from the 
public side of the transaction. In simple terms, without real time reporting the 
institutional investor can control the entire surplus or price improvement and funnel it 
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towards himself. With a real time requirement the institutional investor can arbitrage in 
the dark transaction, but cannot prevent the public from taking price advantages that 
result in the light market. In this instance it may also be true that the bifurcation of the 
total trade volume here into two equal halves is a vast over simplification of the 
institutional investor’s ability to control the amount, divisions, and trade volume that is 
transacted in each sector during the trades. For example, the private participant can 
balance his trade into many smaller subsections and then transact those pieces in 
meaningful and intentional ways to both strategically move shares into and out of the 
private sector while simultaneously moving them into and out of the public sector to 
create the greatest benefit to the investor. The availability of this volume control dynamic 
is at least partially responsible for the changes in trade volumes crossing dark venues 
dropping on average over recent years. The simple single group block trade is no longer 
the norm, broken or separated blocks are the typical transaction.  
This creates both a more strategic break up in share groups being transacted in 
each market, but also creates important distinctions in the price changes taking place 
between the entering and leaving prices in each of the markets. The distance between buy 
and sell prices or the spreads on markets are often sighted as being indicative of market 
volatility. This type of transactional control coming out of the private sector of the market 
has often been sighted as a cause of increased spread in prices and increased market 
volatility (Degryse 2011, Jiang 2011, Weaver 2011, Comerton-Forde 2012, among others 
discussed the market share held in the private sector of the market as being indicative of 
volatility levels). Others have found that the market shares associated with a dark or 
44 
private sector behaving in this manner may not lead to increasing volatility (Buti 2011, 
Ye 2011). The previous studies relating the behavior of private sector participants and the 
volatility of the market as a whole have generally assumed that the private sector of the 
market reports its volume and price informational parameters to the public real time.24 It 
is safe to assume that where dark sector participants can both use advanced strategies to 
move stocks and prices in their favor and the public market remains unaware, even for a 
short period of time, these strategies are likely move the market’s prices in volatile or 
unpredictable ways.  
In short, the price assumptions relating to the movements of prices as stock 
volume crosses the market are an oversimplified version of how demand changes might 
inform the dark without informing the public. The dark sector’s participants are more 
aware and able to strategically trade than could be modeled in this simple comparison. 
Many have sought to detail the behavior and strategies used by dark sector participants. 
In short, the distances between prices, movements of the entry and exit prices, and the 
general volatility of the market’s prices during and resulting from transactions only 
serves to increase the value of the volume and price information contained in the 
transactions taking place in the dark sector. With the growing market share transacting in 
the dark market, the gains that result from these strategic trading practices cannot be 
minimal or unlikely. The sophisticated use of dark and light informational parameters and 
                                                
24 Real-time private sector reporting exists in the vast majority of markets outside the US, 
leading many who study the impact of various dark sectors to assume the real-time 
transfer of information relating to price and volume from those sector to the public. 
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reporting requirements presents a profitable market outlet for institutional investors to 
strategically participate in the upper market tier.   
The venues at which these transactions take place also come with issues, 
differences, and complications of their own. The venues in the public and the private 
sector execute trades in drastically different manners and as a result, have different 
temporal qualities and costs associated with transacting in them. In the dark sector trades 
may be executed through many venues in order to find sufficient liquidity or some 
transactions may not be completed in full because of different constraints on price, time, 
or venue number. In the public sector, market makers and specialists clear the market 
balancing prices, demand and supply guaranteeing that transactions take place, but never 
guaranteeing an execution price. While the NMS stocks are the same and the general buy 
and sell structure of the two sectors matches, allowing liquidity held in one sector to 
execute liquidity held in the other, the structure of the exchanges dramatically changes 
the temporal signatures on how transactions are executed.  
Assuming the time periods across which this model transaction is processed over 
simplifies not only the transactional capabilities and trade offerings in the two sectors, but 
also restricts the relationship the institutional investor has with the dark venues and that 
which the public has with its light exchanges. In the dark sector, interest in making an 
exchange is necessary to seek out other parties with whom to transact, while the public 
simply enters its shares onto the light market without having to seek out other participants 
with whom to transact. A dark sector participant is much more personally involved with 
the venue through which he transacts, indicating his interest to transact, setting volumes 
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and prices he seeks with his transaction, and reacting to results when his trade is either 
accepted or volume is returned to him. The structure of the light market does not facilitate 
this type of involvement. These types of dynamics can also be termed transactions related 
costs because of the effort or time necessary to facilitate the transaction itself. In this 
manner, the dark sector can require more effort in facilitating the transaction than the 
light sector.  
Transactional costs even differ among the means used to make transactions within 
the light sector and within the dark sector. Some have speculated that the venues in the 
dark sector can better diffuse of reduce transactional costs, while others have cited the 
various costs of remaining informed while also participating in the dark sector as so 
costly that they hinder participation in the sector as a whole (Conrad 2003, Brandes 2010, 
Domowitz 2009, among many others). In short, differentiating between the costs of 
transacting in either market carries nuances that are extremely difficult to measure and 
depend highly on the type of transaction being sought and the participant seeking it. The 
simple models assume that those choices are not at issue for neither the institutional 
investor nor the public, and no choice of venue is given to either. This is both rigid and 
simple, meant only to show that delayed reporting requirements lead to the public 
missing out on opportunities for price improvement.  
The issue of venue choice is not a menial one. Self-selection and selection biases 
are crucial elements to the current shape and structure of academic research surrounding 
the existence of dark sectors in any market.  The dynamics, motivations, and structures 
surrounding venue choice are outside the narrow breadth of this regulatory 
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implementation motivation, however, venue choice and appeal are important issues to 
close this model discussion with regard to some venue-by-venue and sector-by-sector 
features. It is inaccurate to say that market participants do not have the ability to choose 
where they transact. This ability depends highly on the sophistication of the investor and 
their access to or carrying capital sufficient to transact in different settings or at various 
costs. The private or dark sector, while on paper open to public participants, does not in 
fact resent a viable trading opportunity for the average Jo-Schmo day trader. This facet 
more generally motivates the assumption that only sophisticated institutional investors 
trade in the private sector leaving the public both information-ally and trade opportunity 
“stranded” in the pubic market. However, even within the private sector, venue and 
aggregator differences lead pools to host similar clientele. 
Dark pools are often termed “toxic” when they become overrun or saturated with 
a certain type of trader. Venues in the dark sector often offer different types of trading 
opportunities, many use the term commoditized trade offerings to describe the different 
trade executions and types available in each venue (Banks 2010). This causes pools to 
become saturated with traders looking for similar types of trades depending on the trade 
capabilities offered in each pool. Research has also supported an increase in adverse 
selection within pools that offer higher probabilities of execution (Sofianos and Xiang 
2011). Others have found that different variations and degrees of pool saturation and 
execution lead to varying biases in selection impacting prices, execution times, and 
transactional impacts (Mittal 2008, Naes 2006). There is strong empirical support for the 
notion that informed trading behavior and uninformed trading behavior tends to cluster 
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itself both in time and by venue of execution, both of these dynamics function to support 
self selection biases within the clusters themselves. (Admati 1988, Pagano 1989, 
Chowdhry 1991). In short, trapping the public in the light sector while allowing the 
institutional investor to trade between sectors was not inaccurate, but it fails to highlight 
the risks associated with the institutional investor’s choice of which dark venue to make 
his entry transaction. However, these concerns fall outside the direct relevance of 
instituting a reporting requirement meant to inform the light sector as to the trades taking 
place in the private venues, whether the venues are over saturated or not.  
There is considerable additional research currently underway to both examine the 
behavior of dark sector participants and the general welfare concerns with the existence 
of dark liquidity more generally. While many believe the existence of dark liquidity to be 
harmful to the market as a whole, there is little empirical work in existence to suggest 
that the sector’s effect on the market or economy as a whole is deleterious. These models 
and the above discussion serve only to motivate the implementation of truly real-time 
reporting requirements on the sector and not to suggest any additional welfare or general 
economic concerns with its existence outside of those relating to the unequal distribution 
of dark sector volume and price information.  
This case comparison was not intended to kill the dark sector or to make any 
statements of judgment about its existence. Instead, the hope is only to inform the public 
as to the necessary trade specific information necessary to make the public or light 
market price accurate for the market as a whole. The implementation of real time 
reporting in the dark sector will not open the dark sector to the public for participation 
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and it does not ameliorate the current difficulties associated with how information is 
reported through CTA.  The reporting requirement only adds trade volume and price to 
the list of other information that reaches CTA in real-time.   
 There are many other nations that already have real time post trade 
reporting for these informational parameters.25 In both markets, even where real time post 
trade reporting existed the dark sector still flourished and each nation took additional 
steps in attempts to reduce the market share held in the dark sector (European 
Commission 2010, D’Antona 2012, Lionidis 2013).  There are disagreements as to the 
exact effects that the implementation of post trade reporting can have on an already 
established sector of the market that had previously existed without real time reporting. 
The existence of a real time post trade volume and price reporting requirement does not 
lead to the death of a dark sector and can exist without having a deleterious effect on the 
growth of that sector, though it may cause the dynamics to change with regard to how 
pool participants execute and structure their transactions (Canadian Dark Pools Consult 
2009). The goal of real time reporting is not to “kill off” the dark sector. Countries with 
these requirements have seen continued growth in market share going in to their dark 
sectors. Reporting requirements are only meant to facilitate informing the market at large 
to the trades that have taken place in the dark.   
                                                
25 Canada and Australia among others. 
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Section VII. 
Dark Ends26 
 
The information on trade volumes and prices within venues in the dark sector is 
important to informing the market at large of the appropriate price for a given stock. The 
current regulatory framework, while mandating volume reporting, does so with a delay 
compared to the real-time reporting taking place in the public or light sector of the 
market. Participants with access to both the private and public sectors can execute trades 
based on knowledge learned from both sectors, while the public, without access to the 
information about prices and volume housed in the private sector, cannot. Instituting a 
real-time reporting requirement for the transactions taking place in the dark, without 
touching other informational parameters therein bridges the price knowledge gap and 
information-ally balances the information participants have about appropriate prices in 
the market as a whole.  
Real time reporting is not in itself perfect or ideal. The current regulatory focus on 
high frequency trading only serves to highlight its downfalls. Many see the informational 
controls available in the dark sector as a cure for the worries associated with real time 
reporting, front running, and high frequency trading. These discussions are outside the 
purview of this thesis. However, whether or not more inside venue controls help to 
                                                
26 “I think my eyes are getting better. Instead of a big dark blur, I see a big light blur.” -
Han Solo, Star Wars Episode VI: Return of the Jedi (1983). 
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ameliorate these problems the information necessary for the public to determine accurate 
prices must be available to all market participants, not only those who have the capital 
and sophistication necessary to participate in the dark sector. While the dark sector and 
its venues are ‘open’ to all participants, the costs of meaningful participation and pool 
membership to too costly for the average public participant. Sector participation 
dynamics aside, the informational access and fairness ideals supported by the reporting 
regulations requirements in the light sector should support the implementation of a 
matching volume and price reporting regime in the dark sector. 
The goal of this project was two-fold, to motivate a real-time reporting 
requirement be implemented over trades taking place in the dark sector of the market, and 
to bridge both the regulatory framework and the economic foundations surrounding the 
informational asymmetries on the US securities market as a whole. The sectional 
composition of this project and the simplified structure of its brief descriptions and model 
reflect those two goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
END 
 
All errors, omission, misattributions, and misstatements herein contained are property of 
the author and the author alone. 
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Appendix 1  
Regulations and Regulatory Entities27 
 
Regulatory Documents 
 
Securities Act of 1933 (The Securities Act) 15 U.S.C § 77 and The Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (The Exchange Act) 15 U.S.C § 77:  
 Regulatory responsibility under the Acts was delegated to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission; the Commission is responsible for providing and 
promulgating rules under the acts that protect investors and foster efficient capital 
formation. The 1933 Securities Act is focused on regulating the offering and 
classification of different securities, while the 1934 Exchange Act is focused on 
the exchange of securities in the primary and secondary markets. Securities 
exchange venues are regulated and defined within the framework of the 1934 Act 
while the securities and assets, which are traded on them are defined and 
regulated within the 1933 Act. 
 
Regulation on Order Handling Rules (1997): Regulation OHR requires all market makers 
and specialists to provide their best quotations and to explicitly report the spread 
that each stock is being purchased and sold across (the best or lowest price at 
which to purchase the stock and the best or highest price at which to sell the 
stock). (61 F.R. 48290-01;see also; Banks 8) 
 
Regulation of Alternative Trading Systems (1998): Regulation ATS served to greater 
define the regulatory application to venues within the section 6 Exchange Act 
definitions. (17 C.F.R. §§ 242.300-.303 (2009).) 
 
Regulation on Fair Disclosure (2000): Regulation FD required public companies, or 
companies whose stock is held publicly and traded on exchanges, to report certain 
information to the public. (65 F.R. 51716-01; see also; Banks 9) 
 
Regulation National Market System (2005/2007/2009): Regulation NMS required that all 
exchanges aggregate their trading and publish (publicly) their quotations for each 
of the assets they carried or traded. The Regulation also required that trades be 
executed at the best price available at the time the trade is executed. (17 C.F.R. §§ 
242.600-.621 (2009)(Regulation NMS was originally passed in 2004 and was then 
updated/revised in 2007 and 2009); see also; Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. 
Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3 Va.L.&Bus.Rev. 191-203 
(2008). 
 
 
                                                
27 “It's against my programming to impersonate a deity.” - C-3PO, Star Wars: Episode 
VI, Return of the Jedi (1983). 
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Regulatory Bodies 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): Also known as The Commission. 
Regulatory responsibility under the 1933 and 1934 Acts was delegated to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC is responsible for providing and 
promulgating rules under the acts that protect investors and foster efficient capital 
formation. The Commission is also responsible for regulating and overseeing 
regulation of the entities, securities, and other objects under the Acts.  
 
The Consolidated Tape Associated (CTA): The CTA is a self-regulatory organization and 
has the authority from the SEC pursuant to regulation NMS to enact reporting 
requirements and to monitor the reporting behavior of broker-dealers and ATS’s. 
The association is officiated by the public or light market exchanges,  
 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA): FINRA is the self-regulatory 
organization that regulates all U.S. broker-dealers and their relationship with the 
investors they service. The organization and its authority were created pursuant to 
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act such that the organization would be self-
regulatory and contain its own regulatory framework under the oversight of the 
SEC. FINRA is responsible for the surveillance, enforcement, and investigation of 
more than 80% of the U.S. equity sector. 
(FINRA Website, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/WhatWeDo/ ; see also; 
Macey, Jonathan, Novogrod, Caroline, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization’s 
Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 936 (2012).; see 
also; Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., FINRA 2010 Year In Review and Annual Financial 
Report 3 (2011) http://finra.org). 
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Appendix 2 
Terminology28  
 
Alternative Trading Systems: Alternative trading systems are trading venues that are not 
regulated as exchanges. These venues match buyers and sellers and facilitate 
transactions, but they do not fall within the regulatory framework for public 
exchanges. In short, alternative trading systems are any non-exchange trading 
system that matches buyer and seller; this definition is very broad and covers a 
range of different types of venues and services. 
 
Aggregator / Venue Aggregator: Venues aggregators exist to offer traders access to 
multiple venues through one hub; where the aggregator acts as the hub. An 
aggregator is a single hub that has access to multiple venues under its control. The 
aggregator does not transact or execute trades; it only provides access to the 
venues its houses or has access to. Because the aggregator does not execute 
trades, it is not subject to trade regulation, each venue is subject to regulation 
because each executes trades, but the aggregator is not.  
 
Block Trading: A block trade is simply a group or large volume of shares to be transacted 
at once. A block can come in any size, 10 shares to 1 million shares, but it is most 
common to refer to block trading when discussing a large volume of shares (1,000 
of more). Many define block trading as being specific to transactions made 
outside the exchange, simply because trading a block suggests that the block 
moves in a single transaction, and that sort of trade control does not exist through 
the exchanges. However, the “block” description only relates to the volume of 
shares grouped together for a particular transaction, large or small.  
 
Crossing Network (CN): Defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission as an 
Alternative Trading System, crossing networks, “…Allow participants to enter 
priced orders which are then executed with matching interest at a single price, 
typically derived from the primary public market for each crossed security.” 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, “Regulation of Exchanges,” 1997.) 
Crossing networks are both the most common dark venue and the most simple 
venue design. The typical crossing network uses a computerized buyer-seller 
matching system, and allows for a variety of different informational controls 
surrounding the trade itself (size controls, participant controls, timing, etc).  
 
Dark Liquidity: Also known as dark pools are also described as private trading liquidity. 
Dark liquidity is liquidity hat is either housed or traded in a way that does not 
reveal its presence, volume, price or other characteristic to the public. Many also 
add privacy in access to the definition because it is typically assumed that public 
                                                
28 “Mmm. Lost a planet, Master Obi-Wan has. How embarrassing.” – Yoda, Star Wars 
Episode II: Attack of the Clones (2002). 
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does not have access to execute with this liquidity. The privacy or darkness of a 
given pool of liquidity depends on the different variety or extent to which 
information is shielded form the public. In this way, some pools that reveal some 
information to the public are termed “grey.” The darkness or level of privacy in a 
given pool is the level of informational privacy or control that is attached to the 
liquidity in that pool. Additionally, many describe the darkness relating to the 
pool that houses the liquidity or the exchange it is traded across while others 
related it to the liquidity itself either existing in the public eye or not.  
 
Dark Sector / Dark Market: The dark sector is the full culmination of the dark liquidity 
on the market as a whole. This sector includes all the varying degrees of darkness 
and includes any liquidity on the market where at least some of the informational 
components are private, or inaccessible to the public. Current estimates as to the 
market share of the dark sector in the US range form 20-40% with little support as 
to the accuracy of either end of that estimate.  The dark sector as a whole does not 
have a single type of privacy, there are multiple different subsectors and sub-
parameters that are made public and private at any time. Each pool within the 
sector can have a different darkness at any time and the escort as a whole is a 
constantly evolving landscape of black, grey, white and everything in between.  
 
Dark Venue: A dark venue is any mechanism that executed trades consisting of dark 
assets or dark liquidity. The most common and most simple dark venue is the 
Crossing Network (CN). These venues include any trading mechanism that allows 
participants to privatize information or hide informational parameters with regard 
to the liquidity being transacted from the public. This includes any shade or 
amount of informational control that takes place, grey to truly dark. These venues 
are often used as the tub in which a dark pool sits in the definition for a dark pool 
focusing on the informational controls provided by a given venue. 
 
Informational Parameters: Informational parameters can be defined loosely as pieces of 
information relating to an asset, trade, or relating to other market issues. This can 
include the size of the trade, price of the transaction, required price, trade issuer or 
purchaser, trade location, trade volume, or a host of other trade related 
information. Parameters can both include what is reported out of trade and what 
information is exchanged during or before the transaction itself. Informational 
parameters are especially important in the dark sector where the parameters and 
their availability can differ from one venue to the next. In the light sector the 
common informational parameter is the price of a given asset. 
 
Institutional Investor: The definitions surrounding institutional investors come in many 
different forms. In the context of this discussion, these are sophisticated investors 
who are capable of participating in both the private and public sectors of the 
market. This means they have the ability to use information they learn in each 
sector, to forecast market movements, and to strategically make trades between 
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sectors and venues to best benefit themselves. These entities typically carry heavy 
stores of fungible capital to make trades, hedge risks, and move large sums on the 
market.  
 
Liquidity: Liquidity is the ease by which the market can facilitate a trade. However, in 
discussing dark liquidity it is helpful to note the secondary definition hidden 
within the facilitation definition. Liquidity is at its base a description of the 
availability of shares held by parties willing to trade, and even more simply, the 
volume of stock that a venue or market participant has access to when trades are 
available. Within this definition dark liquidity facilitates trades where 
informational parameters can be controlled, while light liquidity facilitates public 
trading. The level of liquidity reveals the ease at which those trades can be 
undertaken, high liquidity means easy trading, low liquidity and it may be 
difficult to find trading opportunities.  
 
Market Consolidation: Consolidation is essentially the opposite of fragmentation. The 
market condenses from many venues into several or fewer venues. This is 
typically a description of market behavior used to describe the more recent 
movement in the dark sector. While the sector started off with an explosion of 
many executionary venues the landscape is currently consolidating itself into a 
system of several venue aggregators with few independent or individual venues. 
Many view consolidation as the necessary result form the application of real time 
volume and price reporting, many view the behavior of the Canadian market 
following the implementation of real time reporting requirements demonstrating 
this dynamic.  
 
Market Fragmentation: Generally this fragmentation can be defined as the splitting of a 
single market into multiple and separate sub-markets; each sub-market possessing 
its own liquidity and interacting forces of supply and demand. In the market as a 
whole, fragmentation is often discussed in relationship to liquidity moving from 
one sector to the other (dark/light). In the context of the dark sector alone, this is 
typically discussed in relationship to the early development of the sector by the 
emergence of many small venues dividing the sector into many small venues 
housing small liquidity. There are many differing views as to the results of 
fragmentation, increased competition as a benefit or decreased general liquidity as 
a set back. However, more generally, fragmentation simply describes the structure 
of the liquidity on the market or in a sector; spread like a sallow sea among many 
venues is highly fragmented, while a single deep pool has little fragmentation.  
 
Market Share: In the context of market sectors, a market share is the percentage or 
volume of the market that is transacted in a sector or across a venue. The market 
share trading across a venue is the measure of volume in stock that gets transacted 
across that venue. Measuring the volume of liquidity that is exchanged in the dark 
sector is extremely difficult. The measurement standards among venues and 
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aggregators are not uniform and market share measurement for the sector as a 
whole and venue by venue vary immensely and little work exists supporting a 
standard measure or a method to determine the accuracy of any of the volume 
analyses.  
 
Price Discovery: Price discovery is the act of finding an equilibrium or market clearing 
price where demand for an asset and the supply of that asset clear the market or 
match. In the light sector price is discovered through market clearing obligations 
on market makers and specialists clearing book, or clearing the market of any 
excess shares by transacting those shares by lowering the price. The reporting of 
trades and market movements through real time reporting gives market 
participants information they need in order to interpret what an appropriate price 
should be and in what direction the market might be moving. Price discovery can 
only take place where market participants can match supply and demand through 
the information they receive regarding the availability of liquidity supply and the 
demand for current transactions.  
 
Secondary Market: The secondary market is the market that exists after an initial public 
offering (IPO) has been made and investors are trading shares amongst 
themselves and not with the companies or issuers that issued the stock into the 
market during the IPO.  The secondary market is the market where high 
frequency, dark sector, and all other proprietary trading takes place. Study related 
tot eh function and design of markets generally focuses on the secondary and non-
IPO market unless specific investigation is taking place relating to the issuance of 
stock to the market.  
 
Trade Execution: Trade execution describes the actual transaction relating to the sale or 
purchase of stock. In relationship to venues this is the descriptor used to 
differentiate between venues that transact actual purchases and sales and those 
that connect market participants to other venues or location where they can fulfill 
their transactions. Trade execution is supposed to be fast, quick and efficient. It is 
not true that when a market participants contacts an exchange or a broker that they 
are directly connecting themselves to a securities market, their transaction may go 
through several intermediaries before the transaction is actually executed.  
 
 
 
